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Therefore, I see now that the case respecting the decision of Junius is of this nature, that I think it ought to be called an inroad of
sedition, an instance of the violence of the multitude, an outrage on the part of a tribune,
any thing rather than a judicial proceeding. But if any one calls that a regular trial, still
he must inevitably admit this,—that that penalty which was sought to be recovered
from Junius cannot by any means be connected with the
cause of Cluentius. That decision of the tribunal over which Junius presided, was brought about by evidence. The cases of Bulbus, of
Popillius, and of Gutta, do not make against Cluentius. That of Stalenus is actually in favour
of Cluentius. Let us now see if there is any other decision which we can produce which is
favourable to Cluentius.
Was not Caius Fidiculanius Falcula, who had condemned Oppianicus, prosecuted especially
because—and that was the point which in that trial was the hardest to
excuse—he had sat as judge a few days after the appointment of a substitute? He was,
indeed, prosecuted, and that twice. For Lucius Quinctius had brought him into extreme
unpopularity by means of daily seditious and turbulent assemblies. On one trial a penalty was
sought to be recovered from him, as from Junius,
because he had sat as judge, not in his own decury, nor according to the law. He was
prosecuted at a rather more peaceable time than Junius, but under almost the same law, and on very nearly the same indictment.
But because at the trial shore was no sedition, no violence, and no crowd, he was easily
acquitted at the first hearing. I do not count this acquittal.1
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